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Abstract
The UK income support system o¤ers a guaranteed income level to
single adults available for full time work so long as both earnings and
hours worked are below a threshold level. In this paper we examine the
e¤ects of this on labour supply. We show that the restriction on hours
worked is irrelevant to the household choices and will never bind. We
then look for conditions on preferences under which it is possible to order
households by preferences or the wage in such a way that all claimants
are lower in the order. If there is a common wage and preferences satisfy
a single crossing condition property there is such an ordering in which
the most work averse are claimants. If preferences are common but the
wage rates are heterogeneous then if preferences are quasilinear in leisure
there is also an ordering with low wage households being claimants. With
both wage rate and preferences heterogeneity these restrictions need to be
combined to monotonically order the population.
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It is widely recognised that scal support programs designed to provide a
safety net for unemployed or low wage individuals can have incentive e¤ects
on labour supply . Programs like means tested lump sum transfers, negative
income taxes or workfare programmes can induce nonconvexity or nonsmooth-
ness of the budget set. This can generate poverty trap phenomena where some
groups of individuals in a heterogeneous population voluntarily choose to reduce
their labor supply in order to just maintain eligibility for benet. This cannot
represent a desirable outcome for a government whose target is to guarantee
a minimum income level in the most e¢ cient way. Benet schemes like these
distort the relation between individual marginal rates of substiution for leisure
and consumption and the real wage, raising the number of claimants and the
scal cost of the benet scheme. A desirable system would also be monotonic
in that initially low income individuals (either because they are of low produc-
tivity or a low preference for consumption relative to lesiure) should be induced
to claim and high ones should not. It is essential from a social welfare point of
view to understand how heterogeneous individuals, di¤ering in preferences or
wage rates, would behave facing this type of benet scheme in terms of both the
choice of hours for workers and of participation. The importance of the specic
utility function in determining the labor supply choice of heterogeneous individ-
uals in this kind of setting has been long recognised, but we know of no attempt
to investigate which restrictions on individual preferences are associated with
di¤erent types of labour supply choices.
The main pupose of this paper is to determine qualitative restrictions on
preferences under which a typical income support scheme will be monotonic: the
population can be divided into low wage and/or high leisure preference types
who claim and high wage and/or high consumption preference types who will
not. Earlier work usually used highly specic functional forms for preferences in
which there is a single parameter whose value divides up behaviour into di¤erent
regimes. We use qualitative restrictions on preferences doing the same thing but
without the need for specic functional forms.
In this note we consider income-based Job Seekers Allowance, the principal
UK scal support measure for the unemployed, which consists of a lumpsum
transfer, eligibility for which depends on labour income and on hours worked.
We examine the impact of this income support system on labour supply decisions
of young single adult households in three scenarios: for a group of individuals
with heterogeneous preferences but who all face a common wage; for a group
who have common preferences but with heterogeneity in the wage and nally
for a group with heterogeneity both in the wage and in preferences. Predictabil-
ity of which individuals will claim benet is relevant to social welfare because
it determines both the aggregate labour supply response and the cost to the
government of the benet scheme. It also reveals whether the benet is actually
achieving its underlying aim of assisting lower income individuals.
We show that in each case the hours constraint on eligibility for income sup-
port is irrelevant to labour market decisions and to the population of claimants
since exactly the same people will claim benet whatever the level of the hours
constraint. This raises the question of why the government wishes to use the
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system in this form. In the case of preference heterogeneity with a common
wage, we show that if individual preferences satisfy a single crossing property
there will be a unique critical claimant who is indi¤erent between claiming or
not. This claimant divides preferences of the population into two groups: those
who choose hours of work and consumption to be ineligible for the benet (with
atter preferences and a stronger taste for consumption) and those who choose
to be claimants (with steeper preferences and a stronger preference for leisure).
The single crossing property could arise for various reasons, it could be that in-
nately individuals di¤er in their "laziness", it could be that they are in di¤erent
sociodemographic positions generating di¤erent costs of working (e.g. number
of children). A common way of modelling preference heterogeneity of the latter
kind is to assume that all individuals have a common utility function depending
on consumption and leisure in excess of subsistence levels, with the latter vary-
ing by individual according to sociodemographic status. This type of preference
heterogeneity can also generate single crossing. With wage heterogeneity but
common preferences we show that it may not be possible to divide the wage dis-
tribution at a single point below which all lower wage individuals are claimants
and above which none seek the benet. However if preferences are quasilinear
in leisure or if the threshold level of disregarded income is set to zero then it
is possible to predict unambiguously that high wage individuals will be non-
claimants and low wage individuals claimants. With both wage and preference
heterogeneity we can combine these restrictions on preferences so that if pref-
erences are both quasilinear and satisfy single crossing, assuming lower wage
individuals having steeper indi¤erence curves, then claimants will exclusively
come from the lower part of the wage distribution.
The presence of capital or nonlabor income brings a further source of indi-
vidual heterogeneity. Nevertheless data on young sigle households show their
level to be too low to signicantly a¤ect the analysis.
After a brief literature review, the plan of the paper is to outline the detail
of the income based JSA system in Section 1, show irrelevance of the hours
constraint in Section 2 and then to analyse its e¤ects on labour supply and con-
sumption with preference heterogeneity (Section 3), wage heterogeneity (Sec-
tion3) or both (Section 4).
1 Literature review
Connections between the welfare system and the labour supply of the popula-
tion potentially a¤ected by such programs have been widely researched (Mo¢ tt
1992, Dazinger Haveman and Plotnick 1981). The main issue concerns incentive
e¤ects of the tax-benet system on labour market participation (extensive mar-
gin) and on hours worked (intensive margin) with special focus on low income
individuals (Heckman 1993, AER). The reason for a joint approach to labour
market behaviour and participation in welfare transfer programs is that when
dealing with means tested benets, eligibility ultimately depends on personal
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resources including labor earnings. Individuals can alter their labour market
behaviour in order to become eligible for government transfers. In a basic sta-
tic framework of labour supply, the presence of a tax-benet system alters the
standard budget constraint introducing nonlinearities, due to progressive earn-
ings taxation, and nonconvexities, due to government transfers or allowances.
When indi¤erence curves are continuous and convex, convexity of the budget
set guarantees the existence of a unique optimum labor choice and continuity
of the labor supply function, even though it may not be di¤erentiable at kink
points in the budget constraint. In a non-convex budget constraint framework,
the optimal labor decision need not to be unique and multiple tangencies can
occur, raising the need for an explicit consideration of the underlying utility
function (Hausmann1985). In fact, since the reservation wage theory cannot
be employed, utility maximization has to be perfomed for each of the budget
constraint segments in order to nd local solutions; the maxima maximorum
is then obtained by comparison of the indirect utility function for each of the
local solutions . Moreover, as long as indi¤erence curves are convex, there exist
neighbourhoods in the nonconvex part of the budget set which never contain a
global optimum (Burtless and Hausmann 1978) whose size and location depend
also on the underlying utility function. Individuals optimal choices are expected
to be driven to more extreme positions tending to "convexify" the budget set
(Mo¢ tt 2002).
Another related issue regards the chance of non take-up of benet when pe-
cuniary (information, reporting, application) and non pecuniary (stigma) costs
act as deterrents to welfare participation for eligible individuals (Ashenfelter
1983). It has been recognised that actual take up of benet by eleigible individ-
uals should be determined endogenously, jointly with the labour supply response
of the target population (Mo¢ tt 1983; Mo¢ tt and Keane 1998) . When individ-
uals are not indi¤erent between private and welfare income, two distinct kinds
of nonparticipants arise: those preferring an amount of earnings too high to
pass the means-test and those who are eligible but who nevertheless prefer not
to participate. In such a case an individual initially ineligible will drop below
the means test only when the gain in utility from extra leisure outweighs both
the potential income loss and the participation costs.
Further extensions of the basic static model have included dynamic consid-
erations concerning the life-cycle (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999), human capital
(Kesselman 1976, Mo¢ tt 2001a ) and time limits on welfare receipts(Mo¢ tt
1985).
Alternative transfer program schemes are unlikely to bring unambiguously
desirable labour supply e¤ects and a social welfare function has to be dened in
order to discuss normative issues related to the optimal welfare program design.
There are relatively few optimal taxation models with endogenous labor partici-
pation (Diamond 1980; Mirrlees 1982), but with this approach optimal schemes
can be derived according to the shape of the income distribution, behavioural
elasticities of individuals and government tastes for redistribution (Belsey and
Coates 1994, Saez 2000).
Estimation in the presence of nonconvex budget sets is complicated by the
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presence of multiple net wages each applying to a particular budget constraint
segment and has been discussed in the context of structural approaches (Haus-
mann1985). The estimation relies on the retrievability of the indirect util-
ity function from the uncompensated labour supply. Observed labour supply,
through Roys identity, allows derivation of an indirect utility function consis-
tent with both the actual data and the assumption of utility maximizing behav-
iour. A functional form for the labour supply needs to be specied, properly
describing the data. The estimation of the unknown parameters of the indirect
utility function permits estimation of the labour supply behavioural response
to changes in welfare programmes. The structural approach allows compari-
son of di¤erent transfer schemes. As to the sources of stochastic disturbances,
both the di¤erence between actual and desired hours worked and randomness
in preferences between individuals have been jointly modelled. The statistical
specication allows di¤erences in tastes across individuals to be reected in dif-
ferences in the values of utility parameters . For example the income elasticity
(Burtless and Hausmann 1978, Hausmann and Wise 1980) can be allowed to
vary in the population describing di¤erent preferences for leisure in such a way
that increasing values of the parameter along a continuum are associated with
monotonic changes in the labour supply. Using maximum likelihood techniques,
this structural methodology has been implemented both in continuum and dis-
crete choice frameworks (Mo¢ t and Keane 1998, Hoynes 1996, Hagstrom 1996,
Meyer and Rosembaum 2001), to estimate labor supply elasticities for di¤erent
welfare programmes or reforms.
More recently, the use of reduced-form models to describe the impacts of pol-
icy variations has become more popular both in the US (Blank, Card, Robins
1999, Meyer 2002) and the UK (Bingley and Walker 1997) to support the pol-
icy debate(Fortin, Truchon and Beausejour 1993) about alternative schemes like
NIT(Tobin 1965, Friedman 1962) or "in-work" programs, paying particular at-
tention to programs targeted on the income support of lone mothers or families
with dependent children (Brewer 2001, Blundell and Hoynes 2001, Levy 1979).
In the UK context, some recent empirical literature analyses the behavioural im-
pact of recently introduced in-work credit schemes on labour supply (Blundell
Duncan McCrae Costas Meghir 2000).
2 The UK Income Support System for Single
Adults Households
Income based Jobseekers Allowance is a means tested and non contributory
benet designed to support unemployed peoples income. It is intended for
people of working age, actually looking for a job and available to start working.
According to the income based JSA rules for single households, in order
to be eligible the claimant has to be aged 18 or over, not working more than
an hours threshold e set to 16 hours a week and not in full time education.
Moreover claimantscapital must be lower than a xed upper limit. If capital
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exceeds this upper threshold, eligibility is lost anyway; if capital is below a
lower treshold,it is disregarded for eligibility and the entitlement calculation;
if capital is between these two levels it, is tranformed into tari¤ income to
be summed up to earnings in the means calculation. The scheme works by
topping income up to a guaranteed level G, known as the applicable amount,
set by the Government to guarantee basic living needs depending on personal
circumstances. The awarded amount is then the di¤erence, if positive, between
assessable income (calculated from the claimants earnings wh, other incomes
and capital) and needs, as reected by the applicable amount. In addition, a
threshold amount t of earnings can be disregarded in the means assessment.
3 Descriptive statistics
Based on a 5% sample of all JSA claimants, the Department for Work and Pen-
sions estimates that in 2004 the number of income based JSA beneciaries, in-
cluding partners and dependents, was around 3.432 . The income based version
of JSA makes up 78.96% of all JSA claims. Singles without dependents repre-
sent the vast majority of income based JSA claimants (83.33%), with 72.90% of
them being men. Approximately one third of all claimants are aged below 25.
These estimates seem to indicate that singles without dependents are denitely
the most relevant and numerous group of benet receipients and that the sub-
group of those aged less than 25 years old represents an important component
of it.
The Family Resources Survey data for 2003/2004 show quite a similar pic-
ture: the income based claims form 81.96% of all JSA claims. The category of
singles without any dependents is still the major group of income based JSA
claimants, being 64.54%. 43.66% of this group is aged under 25 years old and
70.68% are men. The FRS data conrms that the group of singles without
children and aged below 25 claimants represents a signicant portion of income
based JSA claimants. Focusing on this category, the following tables show some
statistics for the subgroup receiving income based JSA, the subgroup not re-
ceiving it and for both of them jointly.
.
claimants non-claimants
mean std. dev mean std.dev.
JSA last amount 41.52 6.94 - -
weeks in receipts 28.94 30.55 - -
earned income 2.15 13.12 136.42 134.89
means tested benets 53.33 24.52 2.33 18.23
non means tested benets 0.10 1.27 2.45 15.75
other benets 53.43 24.97 2.53 18.61
total income 58.35 30.33 171.28 127.83
total capital 125.911 499.07 1442.59 11529.05
weekly hours of work 9.5 4.88 32.64 11.97
gross hourly wage 4.50 2.48 5.79 2.95
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Claimants total income derives mainly from means-tested benets, their cap-
ital being denitely lower than the amount of £ 3,000 that can be disregarded
in the means test. Non-claimants had signicantly higher capital but still at a
level that on average is below the threshold a¤ecting JSA. This suggests that in
the group considered the presence of capital only a¤ects the level and not the
shape of the budget constraint.
The gross hourly wage is lower for claimants and the occupational distri-
bution seems to conrm that claimants are more likely to belong to low-wage
occupations, especially elementary occupations not requiring any specic train-
ing or education, as shown in the following table.
occupational classication %
claimants non claimants
managers&senior o¢ cials 1.61 3.12
professional - 4.27
associate prof&technical 3.23 8.98
admin&secretarial 8.06 15.03
skilled trades 8.06 13.56
personal service 6.45 9.57
sales and customer service 24.19 18.58
process, plants,machines operatives 9.68 6.05
elementary occupations 38.71 20.84
The lower amount of weekly hours of work for claimants reects the JSA
eligibility rule which allows a maximum of 16 hours of work a week. The ethnic
distribution appears quite stable in the three cases. A di¤erence is instead
evident in education: claimants look less likely to have received any educational
qualication and if so, they look less likely to have it at the degree level or
above.
% claimants non claimants
white 89.39 88.14
any asian 6.07 7.32
any black 3.8 2.56
any other 0.76 1.98
male 68.15 56.11
total capital lower than 3000 100 88.74
any education qualication 64.97 87.52
highest qual. degree or above 11.82 14.92
From these statistics, the "representative" claimant appears to be young,
single, unskilled and in the unlikely case of working, on low wage jobs.
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4 Irrelevance of the Hours Constraint
We consider a population of S households composed by single adult and assume
that any nancial assets owned are below the level at which the benet is a¤ected
although since the benet is aimed at low earners the assumption is relatively
unimportant. The single adult has a time endowment of T which can be used
for hours of work h or leisure l: The sth adult faces an hourly wage of ws
and the household has preferences dened over consumption cs and leisure ls
represented by the function us(cs; ls): Preferences are strictly quasi concave and
strictly increasing in consumption and leisure and we take u() to be smooth.
The price of consumption is unity and for the sake of convenience no household
has nonlabour income. Both the hours constraint and the means test a¤ect the
budget constraint shape, which varies also according to w, as shown in Fig 4.
Note that concentrating on a sample of young single individuals reduces the risk
that there are additional time constraints that we have neglected such as the
need for childcare or care for elderly family members.
Figure 1
For w < (G + t)=e the hours constraint binds rst and at T   e eligibility
is lost and C jumps down to we < G + t as shown by the continuous line. For
w = (G + t)=e both constraints bind at T   e but consumption increases as
h > T   e, as shown by the dotted-dashed line . For w > (G+ t)=e the means
test constraint binds rst with h < e and consumption increases above G+ t as
h > (G+ t)=w as shown by the dashed line.
Considering the actual UK tax benet system, the budget constaint drawn in
Fig 1 applies to singles aged less than 25 and without any dependents. The same
system applied to singles without dependents, regardless of their age before the
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introduction of Work Tax Credit in April 2003. To these categories no workfare
benet applies. For other groups like lone parents or singles aged more than
25 the presence of in-work benet adds other nonconvexities in the budget set
further complicating the analysis.
The presence of capital or non labour income brings a new sorce of individual
heterogeneity in the considered static framework. As long as capital stays below
the lower limit, only the level and not the shape of the budget line is a¤ected
with an upward shift of consumption for every leisure level. If the capital amount
is above the upper limit, eligibility is lost anyway and the budget constraint goes
back to the standard linear case. When the capital amount is between these
two limits, a tari¤ income is considered in the means test and the budget line
shape is altered in that the income constraint will bind at a lower hours of work
level. Anyway as shown by the data for young singles without dependents the
capital level is so low as to be quite unlikely to signicantly a¤ect the analysis.
For a single person s with no dependents (who after April 2003 is under 25)
the budget constraint has the form
cs = wsHs if Hs > e
= wsHs +G if Hs < e and wsHs < t
= G+ t if Hs < e and t < wsHs < t+G
= wsHs if Hs < e and wsHs > t+G
Some examples in which the hours constraint binds are shown in Figs 2 and 4,
and the same with the hours limit removed are shown in Figs 3 and 5:
Figure 2 Figure 3
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Figure 4 Figure 5
The hours constraint binds when l = T   e: For low wage rates the system
has a built in poverty trap where the hours constraint just binds so that a
claimant consuming G + t would resist increasing hours even if there were an
exogenous marginal increase in the wage since they would lose benet and have
a discontinuous downward jump in consumption. However since G > 0, there
will always be a horizontal section to the budget constraint and so long as
t > 0 a small amount of work which generates income which can be directly
consumed. Hence the horizontal section of the budget constraint also always
imposes a nonconvexity in the constraint. Since utility is increasing in both
leisure and consumption, for any wage and any preferences the optimum can
never involve claiming and choosing hours of work equal to T   e: When hours
are T   e low wage individuals can move to a point with higher leisure and the
same consumption by moving rightwards along the horizontal section, whilst
high wage individuals can move to a point involving the same leisure and higher
consumption by ceasing to be a claimant. Hence just by nonsatiation the hours
constraint will never bind at an optimal choice and individual behaviour in Fig
2 or Fig 3 is indistinguishable, as well as in Figs 4 or 5
Looking at Fig 6 it is clear that there can be one of ve congurations for
optimal choices-preferences and the wage and benet parameters are such that:
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Figure 6
1. the individual chooses not to be a claimant and equates the mrs to the
real wage or otherwise takes zero leisure and the mrs is below the wage.
Whether this case occurs depends on global properties of preferences and
the constraint. For tangency to occur it must be true that the mrs is
steeper than the wage at zero leisure but below the wage at an earnings
level leading to the loss of eligibility for the benet. In addition the indi-
vidual must be better o¤ at a tangency as a nonclaimant than claiming
at A:
2. the individual chooses to be a claimant at A working the number of hours
just yielding the threshold income and consuming G+ t:This case occurs
if the mrs at A is steeper than the slope of the line linking the zero leisure-
maximal consumption point and the point A: However it may also occur
if this does not hold but the individual is nevertheless better o¤ at A than
from not being a claimant.
3. The individual equates the mrs to the real wage and does not earn enough
to meet the threshold income so consumption is just labour earnings plus
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G:This case occurs i¤ the mrs at A is steeper than the wage but at zero
hours is atter than the wage
4. There are two possible optimal modes of behaviour, one of each of the
forms (1) and (2) above.
5. The individual does not work and consumes G:This occurs i¤ the mrs at
zero hours is steeper than the wage and is the normal reservation wage for
a linear budget constraint.
5 Preference Heterogeneity
With preference heterogeneity but common wages di¤erent individuals could be
in any of these ve types of solution. Also as the wage varies or details of the
benet system vary, individuals may switch in arbitrary ways between these
types of solution. Imposing some structure on the preference heterogeneity
allows us to predict the distribution of individuals between types of solution.
Figure 7
Take a given benet system of the form of Fig 7. There are S indi¤erence
maps us in all, through any point there is an indi¤erence curve from each of
these maps. If the di¤erent indi¤erence maps satisfy the single crossing property
i.e. any pair of indi¤erence curves from di¤erent maps cross at most once and
are never tangential, then there is at most one individual whose optimal choices
is indi¤erently at A or F . To see this take the tangency at F for the indi¤erence
curve from map h and consider any atter indi¤erence curve from map j passing
through F: Then the tangency on DE for map j must involve more work and
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consumption than F at say point G . But due to single crossing the indi¤erence
curve from map j cannot again cross the indi¤erence curve from h at A but
must lie above A: Thus any individual j whose preferences are steeper than
those of h will have a unique best choice at G being a nonclaimant. Similarly
in Fig 8 take any indi¤erence curve through F that is steeper than that of h:
This cannot again cross h0s indi¤erence curve at A and so must pass below A:
Hence any individual with a steeper indi¤erence curve through F than h will be
a claimant. Thus the steepness of the indi¤erence curves through any point give
a unique ordering of the consumers: if there is a critical consumer indi¤erent
between claiming or not, then all lazier consumers will claim, all consumers with
a stronger leisure preference than the critical one will not claim.
Figure 8
Similarly the claimants divide up according to bands of the mrs through any
point. There will be ranges of mrss for which the unique optimum is at A;
ranges where the unique optimum involves earning less than the threshold and
ranges where the optimum has zero hours. Any of these ranges may be empty
if for example there is no preference map with an optimum of form (2). Of
course these ranges depend on the common wage and on the parameters of the
benet system.
The single crossing property is close to a necessary condition for an ordering
of individuals according to the mrs at any point such that there is a critical
individual whose mrs divides the population into claimants and nonclaimants.
Suppose we have three individuals 1; 2; 3 and that the rst and third individuals
have particular indi¤erence curves that cross twice but that all other individuals
have indi¤erence curves that only cross once. With a continuum of individuals
with di¤ering mrs at any point we can nd a benet system under which individ-
ual 2 has a steeper mrs than individual 1 at all points, individuals 1 and 3 have
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particular indi¤erence curves that cross twice and individual 1 is a nonclaimant
whilst individual 2 and 3 are claimants-see Fig 9.
Figure 9
If preferences do have the single crossing structure it is practically useful
for the government allowing prediction of the e¤ects of changes in the wage
or the benet parameters on the number of claimants. The government needs
only to identify the critical individual indi¤erent in claiming or not, instead of
knowing the global details of all individuals. Also the government knows that,
given the common wage assumption, it is those with most work aversion who are
claimants. How labour supply varies with the common exogenous wage or with
parameters of the benet system is also predictable. An increase in the G level
will increase the number of claimants and so the governments nancial burden
whilst a decrease in the G level will shift the number of claims in the opposite
direction decreasing consequently the government expenses. As to common wage
shocks, if the population is divided in claimants and the ineligible by a "swing"
household who is indi¤erent between claiming or not, the overall number of
claimants can be shown to shift according to the way the "swing" household
reacts to the wage change, which cannot be predicted without further restriction
on his preferences. If he becomes ineligible, the overall labour supply is increased
since all the households previously ineligible will conrm or increase their labour
supply and further previous claimants might shift to ineligibility raising their
labour supply. If the level of wealth in the same way for all individuals, again the
overall shift in labour supply, claiming and government burden varies according
to the "swing" households choice.
The single crossing property can arise for many reasons, individuals di¤er in
their needs for consumption and leisure. For example there are the demographic
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e¤ects of young children or elderly inrm relatives in the household requiring
care so that the need for nonwork time by the potential worker is higher. Or
a household may have high income needs because there of contractual commit-
ments such as housing rent. One way of modelling this is through using a single
utility function whose origin shifts with individual, thus
uh = U(c  ch; l   lh)
where U() is strictly quasiconcave and increasing, and the preferences of h are
dened for non-negative arguments. Suppose that the subsistence levels ch; lh
are ordered so that if ch > ck then lh < lk: Then at any point c; l where both
preferences are dened if
@mrs=@c > 0
individual h has a lower mrs than individual k: As lh < lk and there is dimin-
ishing mrs, h has a lower mrs at c; l on these grounds. But since ch > ck, h
has lower e¤ective consumption than k and so this reinforces the e¤ects of the
individuals di¤erent leisure needs on the mrs. Similarly if the ordering is such
that ch > ck implies lh > lk then if
@mrs=@c < 0
then at a point c; l, the lower e¤ective consumption of h reinforces the impact
of lower e¤ective leisure, both serving to raise the mrs of h as compared with k:
Households may also di¤er in the e¢ ciency with which consumption or
leisure are transformed into utility. One might expect that an individual who is
more e¢ cient at transforming lesiure into utility would have a lower marginal
need for lesiure and hence a lower mrs. If we model this by
uh = U(ch; bhlh)
then for individual h
mrsh = bh
@U(ch; bhlh)=@l
@U(ch; bhlh)=@c
and
@mrsh
@bh
= mrsh(1 + "hbh); "h =
@ ln(mrsh)
@ ln(bhlh)
where "h < 0 is the elasticity of the mrs wrt leisure measured in e¢ ciency
units. If (1 + "hbh) is single signed everywhere then this is indeed the case. For
example with a linear expenditure system Uh =  ln(ch   A) +  ln(bhlh   B);
"h =  B(ch  A)=[(bhlh  B)2] < 0:
6 Wage Heterogeneity
Instead of varying in preferences, households may have common tastes but vary
in the wage that they face. Without any restriction on the utility function, it
might be possible that higher wage individuals claim benet while a lower wage
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individual does not (as in Fig.10). Also an increase in the wage could induce
a nonclaimant to become a claimant. There could also be two individuals with
di¤ering wages each of whom is indi¤erent between claiming or not claiming
(Fig 11).
The lack of order arises because as the wage changes not only does this
change the market tradeo¤between consumption and leisure but also the thresh-
old point A for disregarded income shifts. In terms of the budget constraint the
increase in wage raises the amount of leisure it is possible to take when earning
exactly the threshold income and hence just maintaining eligibility for the ben-
et. This gives an incentive for higher wage households to cut work to ensure
eligibility. Of as against this the higher wage also gives an incentive to become
a nonclaimant. The result depends on which of these is the dominant e¤ect. If
the threshold for disregarded earnings were set to zero then there would not be
these countervailing incentives.
Formally we can see the two incentive e¤ects as follows. If an individual is
a nonclaimant, utility is given by
v(w) = max[u(c; l)jc = w(T   l)]
whereas being a claimant utility is u(G+t; T  t=w): Since v0(w) = (@u=@c)(T  
l) > 0 and @u(G + t; T   t=w)=@w = (@u=@l)t=w2 the di¤erence between the
payo¤s from claiming or not may be increasing or decreasing in the wage. How-
ever if t = 0 then the utility from claiming is independent of the wage and so
there is an unambiguous incentive to move towards becoming a nonclaimant as
the wage rises.
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If the common utility function is quasilinear in leisure, so that u(c; l) =
f(c) + al, some order in the choices as wage rises is obtained. There can be at
most a single value of the wage at which the individual is indi¤erent between
claiming or not and it can be shown that for any lower wage the individual will
claim and for any higher will not. Under quasilinearity in leisure, the indi¤erence
curves are shifted horizontally so that for any two indi¤erence curves at any
given level of consumption, the di¤erence in leisure between the two indi¤erence
curves is constant (i.e. if f(c1)+al1 = f(c2)+al2) and f(c1)+al3 = f(c2)+al4)
then l1   l2 = l3   l4 ). In Fig 12 the budget constraints for two di¤erent wage
levels wH > wL are drawn. The di¤erence AB in the leisure attainable with
each wage for the consumption level G+ t at the disregarded income treshold is
t(1=wL  1=wH): The di¤erence DC in the leisure attainable with each wage for
the same consumption level G+t where the income eligibility constraint binds is
G+ t(1=wL 1=wH). With G > 0, G+ t(1=wL 1=wH) > t(1=wL 1=wH) that
is the distance DC exceeds the distance AB. So once eligibility is lost, at every
consumption level the di¤erence in leisure between the two budget constraints is
bigger than t(1=wL 1=wH):Consider an individual indi¤erent between claiming
or not at wage wH reaching utility UH = f(G+ t)+a(T   t=wH). If the wage is
decreased to wL when claiming he will enjoy a lower utility level UL = f(G+t)+
a(T   t=wL) because of nonsatiation and wH > wL. Anyway it can be shown
that at this wage level this is the highest attainable utility. The indi¤erence
curve through A has a constant leisure di¤erence of t(1=wL   1=wH) from the
indi¤erence curve through B. Since at any consumption level the di¤erence in
leisure attainable with wH is higher than t(1=wL 1=wH) the indi¤erence curve
through A at any consumption level will always be to the right of the lower
wage constraint. Thus due to nonsatiation, when the wage falls to wL claiming
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is the unique optimal choice.
Figure 12
Consider instead an individual indi¤erent between claiming or not at wage
wL in Fig 13. When the wage is increased to wH , the indi¤erence curve through
B corresponding to the claiming choice is obtained as a parallel rightwards
shift of t(1=wL   1=wH) in the leisure level of the indi¤erence curve through A
corresponding to the claiming choice with wL. At any consumption level in the
ineligible case the di¤erence in leisure attainable with the two wages is at least
equal to DC = G+ t(1=wL  1=wH) > t(1=wL  1=wH) = AB .The indi¤erence
curve through B will never be tangential to the higher wage ineligible budget
constraint and the optimal choice at wH is to choose ineligibility.
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Figure 13
With quasi linearity consumption depends only on the real wage and has a
zero income e¤ect. As the wage increases the gain in utility from the increased
optimal consumption of a nonclaimant rises faster than the gain from the higher
leisure that a claimant can take whilst just earning the threshold income.
7 Mixed Heterogeneity
As shown in the previous sections, with preference heterogeneity if preferences
are single crossing across individuals, it is possible to get an unique ordering
of choices according to the marginal preference for leisure (this is also close
to necessary). With wage heterogeneity if preferences are quasilinear for each
individual, a unique ordering of choices is obtained according to wage levels.
If both preferences and wages are allowed to vary in the population, in
general high wage, low mrs individuals are expected to prefer non claiming.
Single crossing and quasilinearity of preferences in leisure can be combined in
such a way that the heterogeneous population is fully described by the wage and
the preference steepness distributions. Assuming that individuals have quasi
linear preferences di¤ering only for the subsistence level of consumption and/or
the preference for leisure so that Us = f(c   cs) + asl with cs  ct ) as  at
(since with quasilinearity the subsistence level on leisure is just a constant with
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no e¤ect on choices) then for each wage level, there is a unique "steepness type"
cs indi¤erent between claiming or not and at that wage level, all those with
steeper preferences (individuals t with ct < cs and/or at > as) will claim and
all those with atter preferences wont. Also, for each "steepness type", there
is a unique wage level making that type indi¤erent between claiming or not.
For a lower wage than this that type will claim and for a higher wage the type
will prefer to be ineligible. Strict monotonicity accoring to "steepness type"
and wage is obtained as shown in Fig 14 with low wage and "lazier" individuals
more likely to claim. Knowing the distribution of wages and preferences across
population allows prediction about the set of claimants and the consequent cost
to the government of the benet.
Figure 14
So long as it is the low wage individuals who have steeper preferences then
the benet take up will be targeted on the lower wage individuals. However
if the high wage individuals also have the steeper preference for leisure then
claimants may be a mix of high and low wage consumers.
8 Conclusions
The rationale for income support schemes is to provide a safety net for unem-
ployed or part-time low wage households. To achieve this goal without altering
labor supply choices is such a way to increase the government burden with no
corresponding social welfare gain, it is important to be able to predict which
households will choose labour supply making them ineligible for the benet.
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It is also evident that a desirable system would be monotonic in that low in-
come individuals are induced to claim and high ones are not. For single adult
households we show that the UK system is unnecessarily complex in the sense
that the restriction on working hours for eligibility never binds. The role of the
threshold on disregarded earnings is problematic in that it can induce both high
and low wage households to choose eligibility for benet. Unless preference are
restricted in some way the benet is not monotonic. We show that if prefer-
ences are quasilinear in leisure and, when heterogeneous between individuals,
also satisfy a single crossing property, then the impact of the benet system on
labour supply is predictable. In particular if low wage individuals also have a
stronger preference for leisure then this group will form the claimants.
Our results may also be of more general interest in providing conditions
on preferences under which choice from nonconvex budget constraints is pre-
dictable. Earlier work usually uses specic functional forms for preferences in
which there is a single parameter whose value divides up behaviour into dif-
ferent regimes. Our qualitative restrictions on preferences do the same thing
without the need for specic forms. There is a family resemblance to the results
in the asymmetric information literature where for example it is easier to sepa-
rate say worker types if the high ability workers also have a stronger preference
for leisure relative to consumption. Similarly if the main motivation of the
benet programme is to assist individuals with low opportunities, then if there
is poitive correlation between the preference for work and the available wage,
programmes which target initially low income individuals will benet the right
group.
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